Andrew J. Bacevich, "The Real World War IV"

Questions for Making Connections within the Reading:

1. Bacevich asserts that he will provide "a true account of World War IV." one that places it in "its correct relationship to World War III, the Cold War." How does Bacevich's account differ from Norman Poghoretz's? What makes Bacevich believe that his version is the true one?

2. Traditionally, history is understood as an objective account of the past grounded in the facts. Bacevich, though, sees all history "as fraught with ambiguity." Where do you see evidence in Bacevich's account of such ambiguity? Is it possible to be objective while presenting a version of history that acknowledges ambiguity? Does Bacevich's self-described "messier" narrative produce a version of history that is more believable, more accurate, or just more confusing?  

3. Bacevich begins by defining "the ultimate U.S. interest" as "the removal of any obstacles or encumbrances that might hinder the American people in their pursuit of happiness ever more expansively defined." He concludes with the prospect of "perpetual wars" fought "in our vain effort to satisy our craving for limitless freedom." The "pursuit of happiness ever more expansively defined" and the pursuit of "limitless freedom" seem like attractive goals, but Bacevich is troubled by them for reasons he doesn't state outright. How could America's pursuit of happiness and freedom have negative consequences? If these aren't the goals that should be driving American foreign policy, what are the alternatives?

Questions for Writing:  

1. Bacevich does not conceal his dissatisfaction with American foreign policy and with the American citizenry in general. For example, he argues that "a clear majority of citizens" saw "the preposterous enterprise [of the invasion of Iraq] to be justifiable, feasable, and indeed necessary." If Americans really held this view, what made it so appealing? Why does Bacevich think that leaders from both parties have seized "opportunities for massive stupidity" over the past 40 years? What would change if people accepted Bacevich's position on the root cause of the current endless war on terror?

2. What is the difference between viewing the events of Semptember 11 as "vile crimes" rather than as "acts of war"? What would have been gained by seeing September 11 as a crime? What would have been lost? Given Bacevich's reading of the past, would it have been possible for America's leaders or the American public to accept the representation of September 11 as a "crime"? What do you think it would have taken to make this view of September 11 the dominant view?

Questions for Making Connections Between Readings:  

1. In "A World on Edge," Amy Chua argues that "market-dominant minorities are the Achilles' heel of free-market democracy" because their success inspires resentment that leads to instability and violence. Given Chua's assesment, is it advisable for the United States to abandon the "progressive militarization of U.S. policy since VIetnam," as Bacevich recommends? If the United States began to support a general degree of international cooperation, would this approach serve to diffuse tensions created by class differences and economic inequalities, or might it actually worsen these tensions by making America's wealth and power even more frustratingly obvious? Is the solution to the problem Chua has identified to be found in Bacevich's analysis of the U.S. role in shaping the current global unrest?

2. Throughout his essay, Bacevich offers a view of Americans and their leaders as settling for answers that are simple, straightforward, an ill-informed. At one point, he says both groups has "a demonstratable preference for clarity rather than nuance." William Greider, on the other hand, has great faith in the leadership potential of American employees: "[D]oes anyone doubt that, if employees acquired such self-governing powers, the terms of work would be reformed drastically in American business? Or that, if they owned the enterprise together, the rewards and risks would be reallocated in more equitable ways?" What leads Bacevich and Greider to have such opposed views on the preferences and the potentials of Americans? Do they bring these views to their arguments or do their views arise out of their research? Are these views of the average American fictions or descriptions of reality?